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WETLANDS PRESERVATION AND THE PROTECTION OF ENDANGERED SPECIES AS LIMITS ON
WESTERN WATER DEVELOPMENT

Professor A. Dan Tarlock
Chicago — Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology

THE FEDERAL IMPACT ON STATE WATER RIGHTS

I. The Conflict Between Western Water Law and Federal Wetlands and Endangered
Beecies Protection Legislation.
A. The Assumptions of Western Water Law. Western states follow the law
of prior appropriation (subject to dual riparian rights in California,
Nebraska, Texas and Washington). Prior appropriation is premised on the
following assumptions:
1.

The states' waters are owned in trust for the public so that the

acquisition of private rights can be regulated.
2.

The optimal use of water will be served by a system that

maximizes the recognition of private property rights to the use of
water and minimizes public rights for purposes such as instream flow
maintenance. See Tarlock, The Recognition of Instream Flow Rights:
"New" Public Western Water Rights, 25 Rocky Mt. Mineral Law Inst.
Inst. 24-1 (1979).
3.

Private rights should be as secure as possible subject to the

constraint that claims not be asserted for speculative purposes.
Rights are based on the priority of application to a beneficial use,
subject to relation back to the date of filing and endure so long as
the claimant applies the water to a beneficial use and does abandon
the use of suffer a fortfeiture.
4.

The whole stream may be diverted during times of peak demand to

satisfy calls on it. A call may only be rejected by the stream
administrator if it would be futile.

B. The Assumptions of Section 404 of the Clean Water Act and the
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Endangered Species Act
1.

These two acts seek to promote environmental objectives, the

protection of wetlands and endangered species, through regulatory
constraints on public and private activity that is inconsistent with
the objectives. Section 404 balances a range of environmental and
non— environmental factors but The Endangered Species Act prefers one
value, the preservation of biological diversity, to the exclusion of
other values unless there are strong reasons to do so.

2.

The regulatory constraints apply to all forms of private property

ownership, fee simple or usufructory.

3.

Congress made little initial effort to integrate these federal

environmental protection programs with state—created property
systems, especially water law. The assumption seems to have been
that the only appropriate constraint on federal regulation should he
the taking doctrine. e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) and Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 102 S.Ct. 781 (1982)

4.

The first Congressional attempt to integrate environmental

protection goals and western water law was an amendment to the Clean
Water Act. 33 U.S.C.

1251(g), which was added in 1977, provides:

(g) It is the policy of Congress that the
authority of each State to allocate quantities
of water within its jurisdiction shall not be
superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by
this chapter. It is the further policy of
congress that nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to supersede or abrogate rights to
quantities of water which have been established
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by any State. Federal agencies shall cooperate with State and local agencies to
develop comprehensive solutions to prevent,
reduce and eliminate pollution in concert with
programs for managing water resources.
The policy applies only to the Clean Water Act. Congress was urged
to apply it to the Endangered Species Act, but choose to adopt a
weaker cooperation duties on federal agencies to protect western
water rights. See IV A.

5.

Nonetheless, the regulatory constraints imposed on public and

private activities by the two acts may incidentally alter water
allocation patterns vested under state law.

6.

These acts give opponents of water diversion and impoundment

projects a "small handle" to object to the entire project and to
impose substantial operating conditions on the project that may
impair its primary purpose and financial stability, although this
concern has been discounted. An official of the Colorado River Water
Conservation District testified before Congress regarding the
potential effect of the Endangered Species Act on western water
allocation:
One result of the Act's inflexibility
which is of real concern to us, and should be
of concern to all, is the de facto interstate
apportionment and intrastate appropriation of
waters which the FWS is effectively
accomplishing by imposing substantial minimum
flow releases on water storage projects. For
example, in order to obtain a non-jeopardy
opinion on the Colorado River squawfish from
FWS on its White River Dam, the State of Utah
recently had to agree to release a minimum of
250 second-feet (cfs) of water at the dam
during most of the year, with higher releases
in the spawning period, and to augment the
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minimum flow by up to 5000 acre-feet from
inactive storage when natural river flows fall
below the 250 cfs minimum, and as matters
stand now, our own sub-district's Taylor Draw
reservoir, also to be constructed on the White
river above Utah's project, will be forced to
release up to 200 cfs, depending upon river
flows. All of this has the potential to
interfere with appropriative rights under State
water laws as well as interstate apportionments
under the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact.
[Statement of Roland C. Fisher, Endangered
Species Act Amendments of 1982, Hearing Before
the Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution of
the Committee on Environment and Public Works
on S. 2309, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. S. No. 97046230, 235-236 (1982).] See Behnke, The
Impacts of Habitat Alternations on the
Endangered and Threatened Fishes of the Upper
Colorado river and Energy Development in the
Southwest: Problems of Water, Fish and
Wildlife in the Upper Colorado River Basin
204(1980).
II. Section 404 and The Endangered Species Act: Backdoor Federal Water
Rights?
A.

Be Facto Federal Water Rights. These two acts may allow the federal

government to claim de facto federal water rights in situations where
traditional federal proprietary water rights would not be recognized. See
statement of D. Craig Bell, Executive Director Western States Water
Council, Endangered Species Oversight, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Environmental Pollution of the Committee on Environment and Public Works,
U.S. Senate, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. S. No. 97-1-134 311 (1982).

B.

Federal Proprietary Water Rights. The federal government may claim

implied federal proprietary rights for Indian tribes, Winters v. United
States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), or for withdrawn public lands, Cappaert v.
United States, 4 26 U.S. 128 (1976), (protection of endangered species)
that relate back to the date of the reservation not the date of Intent to
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apply the water to a beneficial use as they would under state law. The
theory is that Congress or the Executive either expressly or impliedly
reserved in the withdrawal sufficient water to prevent the purposes of an
Indian or non-Indian withdrawal for a water-related purpose from being
frustrated. The standards for implied federal reserved rights are high.
The federal government must prove that the denial of a water right would
frustrate the primary purpose of the withdrawal. United States v. New
Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
C.

Nevada v. United States. Nevada v. United States

U.S. , 103 S.Ct.

2906 (1983) and related litigation illustrates the use of the Endangered
Species Act as an end-run around the limitations that the Supreme Court
has imposed on federal reserved rights. In 1913 the federal government
brought an adjudication on the Truckee River in Nevada to claim reserved
rights for the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation and to establish water
rights for the proposed Newlands reclamation project. The Tribe was given
12,412 acre feet annually to irrigate 3,130 acres. A subsequent
settlement expanded the irrigated acreage of the reservation and a final
decree was entered in 1944. In 1973 the federal government sought to open
the "Orr Ditch" decree to claim reserved water rights to maintain the
Pyramid Lake fishery. The district court held that the 1944 decree was
res judicada to all new claims, but the Nineth Circuit held that as to
theowners of Newlands project lands the Tribe was not bound by the decree
because the government breached its fiduciary duty to the Tribe by
representing the confliciting interests of the Tribe and the proposed
project beneficiaries. 649 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1981), modified, 666 F.2d
Cir. 351 (9th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court reversed and unanimously
held: (1) the federal government could not reallocate water from project
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beneficiaries to the tribe because the landowners are the beneficial
owners of the water rights, Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937) and Nebraska
v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945), (2) the federal government did not
'compromise' its obligation to one interest that Congress obliges it to
represent by the mere fact that it simitaneously performs another task for
another interest that Congress has obligated it by statute to do." 103
S.Ct. at 2917, and (3) res judicada barred the 1973 suit because (a) the
newly asserted fishing right was the same tribal right asserted in the
original 1913 action and thus the 1973 suit flowed out of the same cause
of action and (b) parties that were not parties to the original 1913 suit
were bound by the "Orr Ditch" decree.:
Orr Ditch was an equitable action to quiet
title, an in personam action. But as the Court of
Appeals determined, it "was no garden variety quiet
title action." 649 F.2d. at 1308. As we have
already explained, everyone involved in Orr Ditch
contemplated a comprehensive adjudication of water
rights intended to settle once and for all the
question of how much of the Truckee River each of
the litigants was entitled to. Thus, even though
quiet title actions are in personam actions, water
adjudications are more in the nature of in rem
proceedings. Nonparties such as the subsequent
appropriators in this case have relied just as much
on the Orr Ditch decree in participating in the
developement of western Nevada as have the parties
of that case. We agree with the Court of Appeals
that under "these circumstances it would be
manifestly unjust... not to permit subsequent
appropriators" to hold the Reservation to the claims
it made in Orr Ditch; "[ably other conclusion would
make it impossible ever finally to quantify a
reserved water right." Id., at 1286. [103 S.Ct. at
2925]
Justice Brennan concurring suggested that the Tribe has a reserved rights
remedy against the federal government and subsequent litigation, discussed
at V D. infra, illustrates the possible relationship between the federal
government's Endangered Species Act duties and its fiduciary obligation to
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the tribe.
D. Section 404 and the Endangered Species Act as the Public Trust. In
recent years it has been hed that private appropriate rights are subject
to the historic public trust rights of navigation protection, Ritter v.
Standal, 98 Idaho 446, 566 P.2d 769 (1977), and it has been held that the
state retains the power to subject new appropriations to a public trust
standard. United Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State Water
Conservation Commission, 247 N.W2d 457 (N.D. 1976). California has gone
further andi held that public trust doctrine may be retroactively applied
to reallocate previously perfected appropriative rights. National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983). The public trust applies and expands
traditional "public interest" powers retained but seldom used by states in
considering appropriation filings:
The state as sovereign retains continuing
supervisory control over its navigable waters and
the lands beneath those waters. This principle,
fundamental to the concept of the public trust,
applies to rights in flowing waters as well as to
rights in tidelands and lakeshores; it prevents any
party from acquiring a vested right to appropriate
water in a manner harmful to the interests protected
by the public trust.
The state has an affirmative duty to take the
public trust into account in the planning and
allocation of water resources, and to protect public
trust uses whenever feasible. Just as the history
of this state shows that appropriation may be
necessary for efficient use of water despite
unavoidable harm to public trust values, it
demonstrates that an appropriative water rights
system administered without consideration of the
public trust may cause unnecessary and unjustified
harm to trust interests. (See Johnson, op. cit.
supra, 14 U.S. Davis L. Rev. 233, 256-257; Robie,
Some Reflections on Environmental Considerations in
Water rights Administration 91972), 2 Ecology L.Q.
695, 710-711; comment, op. cit. supra, 33 Hastings
L.J. 653, 654.) As a matter of practical necessity
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the state may have to approve appropriations despite
foreseeable harm to approve appropriations despite
foreseeable harm to public trust uses. In so doing,
however, the state must bear in mind its duty as
trustee to consider the effect of the taking on the
public trust (see United Plainsmen v. N.D. State
Water Con. Commission (N.D.1976) 247 N.W.2d 457,
462-463), and to preserve, so far as consistent with
the public interest, the uses protected by the
trust.
Once the state has approved an appropriation,
the public trust imposes a duty of continuing
supervision over the taking and use of the
appropriated water. In exercising its sovereign
power to allocate water resources in the public
interest, the state is not confined by past
allocation decisions which may be incorrect in light
of current knowledge or inconsistent with current
needs. 1189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-365]
Section 404 resembles California's public trust standard because the Corps
applies a public interest test to determine whether permits should be
granted, denied or conditioned. The Endangered Species Act is more
restrictive than the public trust because the Department of Interior lacks
the initial flexability to balance species preservation with other
values. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
III.Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
A. Purpose. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344,
authorizes the Secretary of the Army (the Corps of U.S. Army Engineers) to
issue permits "for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters" subject to a veto by the Administrator of the federal
Environmental Protection Agency:
(c) The Administrator is authorized to prohibit
the specification (including the withdrawal of
specification) of any defined area as a disposal
site, and heis authorized to deny or restrict the
use of any defined area for specification (including
the withdrawal of specification) as a disposal site,
whenever he determines, after notice and opportunity
for public hearings, that the discharge of such
materials into such area will have an unacceptable
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adverse effect on municipal water supplies,
shellfish beds and fishery areas (including spawning
and breeding areas), wildlife, or recreational
areas. Before making such determination, the
Administrator shall consult with the Secretary. The
Administrator shall set forth in writing and make
public his findings and his reasons for making any
determination under this subsection.
B.

Scope of Permits. 33 U.S.C.

1344(e)(1) allows the issuance of either

site specific permits or general permits on a state, regional or
nationwide basis for activities that are similar in nature and "will cause
only minimal adverse environmental when performed separately, and will
have only minimal cumulative adverse effect on the environment." As the
result of a suit challenging the Corp's issuance of nationwide permits,
National Wildlife Federation v. Marsh, No. 83- 3632 (D.D.C. 1982), the
Corps has proposed new regulations. 49 Fed. Reg. 12660, March 29, 1984.
The proposed regulations would limit the use of nationwide permits in two
areas, "isolated waters" and "areas above headwaters." Under the
proposal, general use of nationwide permits inthese areas would only be
allowed where less than one acre is involved. Dredge or fill activities
on ten or more such acres would require individual permits. Activities
involving one to ten acres in these areas would require notification to
Corps district offices, which would prompt an evaluation process aimed at
determining whether the activities could be allowed under a nationwide
permit or whether an individual permit should be required.

C.

Jurisdiction of the Corps. Navigable waters are defined in the Clean

Water Act as waters of the United States and this definition allows the
Corps to use the full reach of the Commerce Power in defining
navigability. Thus, the Corps is not bound by the tradition "chain in the
hghway of interstate commerce test of navigability. e.g. State of wyoming
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v. Hoffman, 437 F. Supp. 114 (D. Wyo. 1977) Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke,
578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978). and United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.
599 F.2d 368 (10 Cir. 1979); The latest revision of the regulations
changes the definition of waters of the United States to:
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were
used in the past, or may be susceptible to use in
interstate or foreign commerce...,
(2) All interstate waters including interstate
wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as...wetlands...the use,
degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce.;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as
waters of the United States under this definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs
(a)(1)—(4) of this section;...
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters...identified in
paragraphs (a)(1)—(6) of this section. ..(33 C.F.R.
323.2(a) (1983)1
D. Exemptions. 33 U.S.C. it 1344 (f)(1) provides the following exemptions
from a Section 404 permit requirement:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection, the discharge of dredged or fill material-(A) from normal farming, silviculture, and
ranching activities such as plowing, seeding,
cultivating, minor drainage, harvesting for the
production of food, fiber, and forest products, or
upland soil and water conservation practices;
(B) for the purpose of maintenance, including
emergency reconstruction of recently damaged parts,
of currently serviceable structures such as dikes,
dams, levees, groins, ripra;, breakwaters,
causeways, and bridge abutments or approaches, and
transportation structures;
(C) for the purpose of construction or
maintenance of farm or stock ponds or irrigation
ditches, or the maintenance of drainage ditches;
(D) for the purpose of construction of
temporary sedimentation basins on a construction
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site which does not include placement of fill
material into the navigable waters;
(E) for the purpose of construction or
maintenance of farm roads or forest roads, or
temporary roads for moving mining equipment, where
such roads are constructed and maintained, in
accordance with best management practices, to assure
that flow and circulation patterns and chemical and
biological characteristics of the navigable waters
are not impaired, that the reach of the navigable
waters is not reduced, and that any adverse effect
on the aquatic environment will be otherwise
minimized;
(F) resulting from any activity with respect to
which a State has an approved program under section
1288(b)(4) of this title which meets the reuirements
of subparagraphs (B) and (C) of such section, is not
prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation
under this section or section 1311(a) or 1342 of
this title (except for effluent standards or
prohibitions under section 1317 of this title).

(2) Any discharge of dredged or fill material nto
the navigable waters incidental to any activity having as
itspurpse bringing an area of the navigable waters into a
use to which it was not previously subject, where the
flow or circulation of navigable waters may be impaired
or the reach of such waters be reduced, shall be required
to have a permit under this section.
E. Procudures and Standards.
1. Procedures. Neither the statute nor due process
requires a trial-type hearing. Buttrey v. United States,
690 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied
U.S,
(1983).
2. Standards. Section 404 permits are subject to a
number of substantive administrative criteria, 1902
, 19 ERC 1926
F. Supp.
Atlantic LTD v. Hudson,
(E.D. Va. 1983), but the major standard is a public
interest review that allows the Corps to balance the
benefits of the project against its environmental
detriments. See Parish and Morgan, History, Practice and
Emerging Problems of Wetlands Regulation: Reconstructing
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, 17 Land & Water L.
Rev. 43 (1982) and Want, Federal Wetlands Law: The Cases
and the Problem, 8 Harvard Envtl. L. Rev. 1(1984).

IV. The Endangered Species Act.
A. Purpose. The primary purpose of the Act is to "provide a program for
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the conservation of . . . endangered species and threatened species." 16
U.S.C.

1531(b). In 1982 Congress added the following section to the

statement of purpose: "It is further declared to be the policy of
congress that Federal agencies shall cooperate with State and local
agencies to resolve water resource issues in connection with conservation
of endangered species." 16 U.S.C. 5 1531 (c) (2).
B.

Endangered Species. 16 U.S.C. 5 1532(6) defines the term "endangered

species:"
Any species which is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range
other than a species of the Class Insecta determined
by the Secretary to constitute a pest whose
protection under the provisions of this chapter
would present an overwhelming and overriding risk to
man.
16 U.S.C. 5 1532(8) defines "fish and wildlife:"

C.

Any member of the animal kingdom, including
without limitation any mammal, fish, bird (including
any migratory, nonmigratory, or endangered bird for
which protection is also afforded by treaty or other
international agreement, amphibian, reptile,
mollusk, crustacean, arthropod or other
invertebrate, and includes any part, product, egg,
or offspring thereof, or the dead body of parts
thereof.
Species Listing. To qualify for protection, a species must be listed

through a rule making process by the Secretary of Interior as endangered
or threatened. 16 U.S.C. 5 1533. A petition process exists which can be
initiated by anyone with standing under the Administrative Procedure Act
to challenge agency action. 16 U.S.C. 5 1533 (3) — (6). 16 U.S.C.
1533(a)(1) provides the relevant factors for listing a species:

(A) the present or threatened destruction,
modification, or curtailment of its habitat or
range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational,
scientific, or educational purposes;
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(C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanism;
Or

(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its
continued existence.
D. Critical Habitat Listing. To protect a species, its habitat must be
protected and thus the Secretary must designate critical habitat. 16
U.S.C.

1532(5)(A) defines the term to limit critical habitat designation

to the area necessary for the species survival:

(i) the specific areas within the geographical area
occupied by the species, at the time it is listed in
accordance with the provisions of section 1533 of
this title, on which are found those physical or
bilogical features (1) essential to the conservation
of the species and (II) which may require special
management considerations or protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area
occupied by the species at the time it is listed in
accordance with the provisions of section 1533 of
this title, upon a determination by t he Secretary
that such areas are essential for the conservation
of the species.
16 U.S. S 1533 (2) sets out the relevant factors for
contracting or expanding the designated habitat:
the Secretary shall designate critical habitat,
and make revisions thereto, under subsection 9a)(3)
of this section on the basis of the best scientific
data available and after taking into consideration
the economic impact, and any other relevant impact,
of specifying any particular area as crtical
habitat. The secretary may exclude any area from
critical habitat if he determines that the benefits
of such exclusion outweigh the benefits of
specifying such area as part of the critical
habitat, unless he determines, based on the best
scientific and commercial data available, ,that the
failure to designate such area as critical habitat
will result in the extinction of the species
concerned.

These sections preclude the Department of Interior from designating the
entire range of the species as critical habitat except for small, confined
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populations. 16 U.S.C.

1532(C).

D. Agency Consultation Duties With the Secretary of the Interior, 16
U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) provides:
Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with
and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure
that any action authorized, funded, or carried out
by such agency (hereinafter in this section refered
to as an "agency action") is not likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of habitat or
such species which is determined by the Secretary,
after consultation as appropriate with affected
States, to be critical, unless such agency has been
granted an exemption for such action by the
Committee pursuant to subsection (b) of this
section. In fulfilling the requirements of this
paragraph each agency shall use the best scientific
and commercial data available."
1. Supreme Court Intrepretation of 1973 version of Section 7
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), enjoined the
completion of a dam that was 90% complete because it threatened the
survival of the snail darter (a biological premise that has since
been refuted):" [T]he legislative history undergirding 5 7 reveals
an explicit congressional decision to require agencies to afford
first priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered
species. The pointed omission of the type of qualifying language
previously included in endangered species legislation reveals a
conscious decision by Congress to give endangered species priority
over the 'primary missions' of federal agencies." [437 U.S. at
1851 See generally Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An
Overview of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 51 North Dakota L.
Rev. 315 (1975) and note, Obligations of Federal Agencies Under
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 28 Stanford L. Rev.

14

124 § (1976). The 1978 Amendment did not change substantially the
duties of federal agencies to protect endangered or threatened
species.
Although the 1978 Amendments to ESA softened
the obligation on an agency from requiring the
agency to "insure" the species would not be
jeopardized to requiring the agency to "insure" that
jeopardy is not "likely", Pub. L.No.96-159,
4(1)(C), 93 Stat. 1225, 1226 (1979), the legislative
intent was that the Act "continues to give the
benefit of the doubt to the species."
H.Conf.Rep.No.96-697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12,
reprinted in [1979] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News, 2557,
2572, 2576. Agencies continue to be under a
substantive mandate to use "all methods and
procedures which are necessary", TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 185, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2297, 57 L.Ed.2d 117
(1978) (quoting 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(c), 1532(2),
emphasis added by the court), "to prevent the loss
of any endangered species regardless of the cost."
Id. at 188 n.34, 98 S.Ct. at 2299 n.34 (emphasis in
original). The Act does, however, create a special
"exemption" procedure (not at issue here, see note
2, supra) designed to allow necessary actions even
if they threaten the loss of an endangered
species. See 16 U.S.C. §i 1536(g), (h). [Roosevelt
Campobello Island International Park v. United
States Environmental Protection Agency, 684 F.2d
1041, 1048 - 1049 (1st Cir. 1982] See generally
Comment, Endangered Species Act Amendment of 1978:
A Congressional Response to Tennessee Valley
Authority v. HilL, 5 Columbia J. Envtl. Law
283(1979).
2. Agencies Biological Assessment Duties. If the Secretary
determines, based on the best scientific and commercial data
available, that an endangered or threatened species may be present,
the agency undertaking the activity must conduct a biological
assessment using the best scientific data available. This may
require an agency to undertake new, state of the art studies that
make a worst case analysis. Compare Roosevelt Compobello
International Park v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,
684 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir. 1982) (Coast Guard must do real time
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simulation studies to determine the adverse effects of an oil spilt
on right and humpback whales) with Village of False Pass v. Clark,
F.2d., 20 ERC 17 05 (9th Cir. 1984) and Village of False Pass v.
Watt, 565 F. Supp. 1123 (D. Alaska 1983) (Secretary of the Interior
must have precise, site-specific information to insure best
compliance with Act, but this duty may be satisfied by plans to
suspend the activity, oil and gas drilling, when species, whales, are
near enough to be threatened by oil spills). See also Cabinet
Mountains Wilderness Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685
F.2d 678 (D.C. 1982).
3. Jeoparadize. Coggins and Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters
in Port Barrels: Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70
Georgetown L.J. 1433, 1465 (1982) argue:
A reasonable definition of "jeopardize" is
any substantial harm to any population segment
of any listed species. That a species is
listed as endangered itself indicates that any
adverse effect could contribute to its
extinction. The use of "jeopardize" in the
statute instead of "result in extinction"
suggests that Congress contemplated a less
demanding standard. The administrative
interpretation, which is entitled to some
deference, takes a middle-of-the-road
approach: an agency action does not "comply if
it might be expected to result in a reduction
in the number or distribution of that species
of sufficient magnitude to place the species in
jeopardy, or restrict the potential and
reasonable expansion or recovery of that
species..." Since an endangered species is
already in jeopardy and a threatened species is
close to it, only a de minimus impact on the
species should be tolerable in applying section
7.

See North Stope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
E. Exemptions. TVA v. Hill caused Congress to amend that Act to provide
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an exemption procedure. 16 U.S.C. i 1536 (e) - (p). Exemptions are
granted by a two-tiered process. The final decisionis made by cabinet
level committee, although the committee decision may be vetoed by the
Secretary of the Interior and overriden by the committee if the secretary
finds that the exemption would extinguish a newly discovered threatened or
endangered species. The substantive standards for the grant of an
exemption are:
(1)The Committee shall make a final determination
whether or not to grant an exemption within 30 days
after receiving the report of the Secretary pursuant
to subsection (g)(5) of this section. The Committee
shall grant an exemption from requirements of
subsection (a)(2) of this section for an agency
action if, by a vote of not less than five of its
members voting in person-(A) it determines on the record, based on the report of
the Secretary, the record of the hearing held under
subsection (g)(4) and on such other testimony or evidence
as it may receive, that-(i)there are no reasonable and prudent
alternatives to the agency action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly
outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of
action consistent with conserving the species
or its critical habitat, and such action is in
the public interest;
(iii)the action is of regional or national
significance; and
(iv) neither the Federal agency concerned nor
the exemption applicant made any irreversible
or irretrievable commitment of resources
prohibited by subsection(d) of this section;
and
(B) it is establishes such resonable mitigation and
enhancement measures, including, but not limited to,
live propagation, transplantation, and habitat
acquisition and improvement, as are necessary and
apropriate to minimize the adverse effects of the
agency action upon the endangered species,
threatened species, or critical habitat concerned.
Any final determination by the Committee under this
subsection shall be considered final agency action
for purposes of chapter 7 of Title 5.
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F. Double Jeopardy. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(2)(B) makes it unlawful to "remove
or reduce to possession any such species from areas under Federal
Jurisdiction." The "taking" prohibition has caused concern that this
section will provide a separate and even more absolute basis for the
stopping water resource projects than the consultation process. See
Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Resources, 471 F. Supp. 985 (D.
Haw. 1979). aff'd 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981) which applied this section
to non-federal, state game conservation programs. In 1982 Congress
reduced somewhat the double jeopardy risk by an exemption process. 16
U.S.C.

1539. The Secretary of the Interior make a grant a permit for q

Section 1538 "taking" if he finds that:
(i) the taking will be incidental;
(ii) the applicant will, to the maximum extent
practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of
such taking;
(iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate
funding for the plan will be provided;
(iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the
species in the wild. . .
V. Section 404 and The Endangered Species Act's Effect on State Water

A.

Rights.

Private Rights Effected. The effects of a publicly funded or

regulated project on private actions are relevant factors for the
federal agency to consider. e.g., National Wildlife Federation v.
Coleman, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), rehearing denied, 532 F.2d
1375, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1977).
B.

Tenth Amendment Not A Bar to Federal Preemption. State

regulation of a resource under its police power including claims of
trust ownership is not a bar to federal preemption. Congress may
protect endangered or threatened species under the Treaty or Commerce
powers. Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources,
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471 F.Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), affrd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981)
(Endangered Species Act may require change in state game conservation
practices to protect habitat of threatened species.) See also
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) and Hughes v. Oklahoma 441
U.S. 322 (1979).
C. Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration (Greyrocks).
Nebraska v. Rural Electrification Administration, 12 ERC 1156 (D.
Neb. 1977), appeal vacated and dismissed, 594 F.2d 870 (8th Cit.
1979), is the first major case to apply the two acts to a water
allocation controversey. Nebraska sued to prevent the construction
of Greyrocks Dam by a consortium of utilities on the North Platte
River, originally to protect the interests of downstream Nebraska
agricultural diversions. The court set aside a federal loan
guarantee from the Rural Electrification Administration and a Section
404 permit because of the effect of the diversion on the downstream
habitat of the whooping crane. The REA failed to consult with the
Fish and Wildlife Service, and the court concluded that an REA
conclusion that there would no adverse effect on the whooping crane
habitat did not insure that there would be no jeoparady to the
species. The Corps issued a 404 permit before the Fish and Wildlife
Service completed its assessment, but reserved the right to impose
operating conditions on the reservoir when the Fish and Wildlife
study was complete. The court held that allowing reservoir operation
before adequate biological information was available did not insure
that the habitat would not be endangered. A settlement favorable to
the whooping crane and Nebraska irrigators ended the litigation. See
Tarlock, The Recognition of Instream Flow Rights. "New" Public
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Western Water Rights, 25 Rocky Mt. Mineral Law Inst. 24-1, 24-60-61
(1979).

D. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy District v. Watt. (Pyramid
Lake). Carson Truckee Water Conservancy District v. Watt, 549 F.
Supp. 704 (D. Nev. 1982) holds that the Secretary of the Interior has
a duty to operate a reservoir to protect endangered and threatened
species, cui-ui and Lahontan cut in Pyramid Lake on the Pyramid Lake
Indian reservation, throat trout. All parties agreed that the
Secretary had a duty to prefer fish to municipal and industrial uses
in the operation of Stampede Reservoir in allocating water over and
above that involved in the Orr Ditch litigation. See II C supra.
The issue was to what decree, and the court held that the Secretary
had a duty to prefer all other uses until the fish were no longer
classified as threatened or endangered. The court rejected the
District's argument that the Endangered Species Act required the
Secretary to avoid only those actions that jeopardized the bare
survival of the species. As a consequence, the District's operating
plan for the reservoir was found to inconsistent with the Secretary's
species restoration duties under the Act and his fiduciary obligation
to the Tribe:
For plaintiffs to be able to serve new M &
I users, they must hve enough water in storage
to insure a steady supply in drought years.
The plaintiffs' plan would require the release
of M & I water in small quantities, and most of
the total annual M & I releases would occur
outside the spawning season, when it would not
help increase the Fish population.
Water releases for the fishery in a single
year may require all of the Stampede storage,
leaving no reserve for M & I users in drought
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years. In my view, it is not feasible to
operate Stampede for both M & I fend fishery
purposes.
Plaintiffs concede that it is unlikely
that the fish population of Pyramid Lake will
increase substantially under their proposal for
operating Stampede. The plaintiffs' plan would
reduce the average river flow during the
spawning season 20% below the level which
existed before Stampede was built. This amount
is inadequate to meet the Secretary's
obligation under the Endangered Species Act.
Before Stampede was built, there was not enough
water for the cui-ui, and the cut-ui were
practically extinct. The plaintiffs proposal
does not meet their own standards because it
would jeopardize the existence of the cui-ui
and hasten their extinction. [549 F. Supp. at
711].
E. Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews (Wildcat Creek).
Riverside Irrigation District v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583 (D. Colo.
1983) holds that the Corps has the discretion to require an
individual rather than nationwide section 404 permit for a dam on the
tributary of the South Platte that would alter flows and thus have an
adverse impact on the whooping crane habitat 250 to 300 miles
downstream. The court reasoned that the Endangered Species Act
boulstered the Corps' authority to take off-project water depletion
effects into consideration in deciding whether to issue a nationwide
(and presumeably) individual 404 permit. The court rejected
argument's that Section 101 (g) of the Clean Water Act and the South
Platte Compact compelled a different result:
First, congressional policy statements "cannot
nullify a clear and specific grant of
jurisdiction, even if the particular grant
seems inconsistent with the broadly stated
purpose."
. . .
Because both the statements of S 101(g)'s
sponsor and the relevant committee report state
that * 101(g) was not intended to change
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existing law, including * 510(2), congress did
not intend to limit i 404's scope where it
might affect state water rights law when it
enacted § 101(g).
The plaintiffs' argument is further
diminished because the defendant's actions did
not abrogate or supersede anys tate water
rights. As discussed above, the defendant only
placed conditions on the construction of the
dam that might affect the plaintiffs' water
rights. While the defendant is barring the
plaintiffs from exercising their water rights
in a manner inconsistent with federal law, he
is not taking away the rights. They must still
be utilized, so long as in a manner consistent
with federal law. . .
They argue that congress could not pass a
clean water act that would impair this
previously approved compact. This argument
should be rejected. It is true that congress
cannot unilaterally reserve the right to amend
or repeal an interstate compact. Tobin v.
United States, 306 F.2d 270, 273 (D.C. Cir.
1962). This does not mean, however, that
approving a compact limits congress's authority
later to enact federal laws. In Pennsylvania
v. Wheeling, supra, the court held:
The question here is, whether or not the
compact can operate as a restriction upon
the power of congress under the
constitution to regulate commerce among
theseveral states? Clearly not.
Otherwise congress and two States would
possess the power to modify and alter the
constitution itself.
A subsequent federal law of nationwide
applicability will therefore be enforceable
even if it affects a prior compact. Congress
therefore did not limit its authority to enact
the Clean Water Act when it approved the South
Platte Compact. [568: F. Supp at 589-590].
Attempts were made to overcome the decision in Congress but EPA opposition
seems to have ended this effort. 509 Western States Water Feb. 17,
1984. Compare National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (Dams are not print sources under Clean Water Act).
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F. Depletion versus Inundation.
Projects that propose to deplete a stream rather than inundate a critical
habitat pose substantial but more manageable problems under the Endangered
Species Act because depletions pose less of a threat to species survival
compared to inundations, e.g. the Windy Gap project in Colorado. The Fish
and Wildlife Service approved the project after theproject sponsors agreed
to by-pass 11,000 acre feet of water anually for the protection of
downstream aquatic habitat, primarily non-endangered trout, because these
releases combined with habitat enhancement and research would not
jeopardize endangered species.
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